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Abstract 
We estimate the treatment effect associated with attending a private instead of a public 
voucher school in the Chilean voucher system.  We find a large and significant positive 
treatment effect. We analyze the influence of peer effects on our result by estimating 
new treatment parameters that control for peer group characteristics. When we do so, 
we still find a positive treatment parameter that is large in magnitude and statistically 
significant. Hence we conclude that the positive treatment effects are not due to peer 
effects and sorting, but rather stem from the greater efficiency of private voucher 
schools.    2
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  Studying the Chilean education voucher system is of great interest in 
assessing the theoretical literature on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
voucher system.  In this paper we estimate the treatment effect associated with 
attending a private voucher school instead of a public one, using the 2002 test 
scores of 4
th grade students in elementary school.  
The voucher system was introduced in Chile in 1982. It includes both 
public schools that are run by the municipalities, and private subsidized 
schools. In addition to the voucher, some municipal schools (MUN for short) 
receive extra funds both from the Ministry and/or the municipality
1. Private 
subsidized schools (PS for short) can also receive extra funds from the 
Ministry, and/or charge fees from parents (up to a limit).  
To evaluate the effectiveness of private versus public voucher schools, it 
is important to compare schools with similar budgets. For this reason, we focus 
on schools that charge low fees (or no fees at all) when we estimate treatment 
parameters and hence are financed almost entirely by the voucher. Working 
with these schools we find a large and significant positive treatment parameter. 
Since some authors claim that sorting and peer effects are important factors in 
how voucher systems work, this positive and large treatment effect could be the 
result of these effects, and not the consequence of greater private voucher 
school effectiveness.  
                                                 
1 These funds are either channeled through programs handled by the central government, or 
consist of subsidies bestowed by  local government to cover deficits.   3
To analyze whether our results are dependent on peer effects, we re-
estimate the treatment parameters controlling for peer group characteristics. If 
the positive treatment effect estimated without controlling for peer group 
characteristics were exclusively the result of the sorting process and peer 
effects, this new treatment parameter should be zero. However, when we 
condition on peer group characteristics, we still find a gain associated with 
attending a private voucher school instead of a public one. That is, the effect of 
treatment on the treated or TT is still large in magnitude and statistically 
significant, illustrating the robustness of our results. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the early empirical literature evaluating the voucher system in 
Chile suffered from methodological and/or data limitations
2. This literature 
used the results of a standardized test taken every year since 1987 in all schools 
as a measure of output. The test is taken by different grades: 4
th and 8
th grade in 
elementary school, and 2
nd grade in high school, in alternate years.  Up until 
1998 no individual data was available for this test (called SIMCE). Hence 
empirical papers used the school as the unit of study (see for example Mizala 
and Romaguera (2000)). Additionally, these studies lacked good information on 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the students, and had to use proxies to 
approximate average characteristics of the school.  These limitations meant they 
were unable to correct for selection bias in the estimation of the treatment 
                                                 
2  For a discussion of the empirical literature in Chile, see Sapelli and Vial (2002).   4
effects
3. More recent literature (for example Contreras (2001) and Tokman 
(2002)) uses individual data and corrects for selection bias. These studies found 
significant differences in scores between public and private voucher schools. 
However, they did not take into account that some public schools (i.e., 
municipal schools) receive additional resources from the government, through 
municipal transfers or through participation in special government programs.  
Sapelli and Vial (2002) take these differences in school budgets into 
account. They separate geographical areas according to the amount of per capita 
additional funds that public schools receive from the government (in addition to 
the voucher). In areas where public and private voucher schools receive similar 
per capita subsidies (where public schools receive up to 25% more funds than 
private voucher schools), they find a positive and large TT
4. 
Mc Ewan and Carnoy (1998) and Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) argue that 
the main result of the introduction of vouchers in Chile has been sorting. Hsieh 
and Urquiola show that higher enrollment in private schools coexists with lower 
test scores in public schools in the same municipality. The key problem with 
this study is that it ignores the issue of causality: the negative correlation 
between test scores and private enrollment could be either proof of the peer 
effect, or alternatively proof that entry is endogenous and occurs first where 
municipal schools are doing a poor job (see Hoxby (2001)).  Gallego (2002) 
                                                 
3 Another common methodological problem in this empirical literature is the inclusion of school 
inputs in the estimation, confounding the estimation of production functions with the estimation 
of treatment effects. 
4 They used 1998 SIMCE results, for second grade in high school.   5
finds that the issue is crucial: results with and without controlling for 
endogenous entry differ significantly. After controlling for endogeneity, he 
finds that competition from private subsidized schools increases the test scores 
of municipal schools
5.  
  In any case these papers pose the question of whether positive TT’s are 
the result of sorting and peer effects. We intend to answer this question. 
 
III.  ESTIMATING TREATMENT EFFECTS 
In this section we estimate treatment parameters using the normal 
model
6. We use individual data for the test taken in 2002 by the fourth grade of 
primary school
7. A separate, simultaneous survey, that can be matched to test 
results, provides the data on individual socioeconomic characteristics. We also 
have information on the characteristics of the schools and the amount of money 
that each municipality gives to the schools they run. Finally, we use aggregate 
information by geographical area from the CASEN national survey taken in 
2000. 
The main advantage of using 4
th grade (rather than older students’) test 
scores is that at this level, parents usually choose a school in the same area they 
live in. This fact is central to our identification strategy, as will be seen when 
the validity of our exclusion restriction is discussed. It is also important that 
                                                 
5 Note that Gallego obtains the same results as Hsieh and Urquiola when he does not control for 
endogenous entry. 
6  For an explanation of the normal model, see Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000). 
7 We exclude schools in rural areas, and students who attend special schools (for example, 
schools for blind or deaf students).   6
since 2000, parents declare how much money they pay to the school
8. This 
allows us to focus our attention on schools that charge low fees, and hence are 
more similar to “pure” voucher schools, working with similar budgets.   
 
The Normal Model 
We assume that, given school characteristics, potential test scores in 
public and private voucher schools (Y0 and Y1 respectively) are determined by 
the following individual-level characteristics: family income group, education 
of the student’s mother and father, family size, age and gender of the student, 
whether the student has failed a grade and whether he/she received pre-school 
education. Public schools and private subsidized schools exploit these 
characteristics differently, so potential test scores in each type of school may be 
different for a given student. We assume that potential test scores can be 
represented by the following output equation:  
YD=XβD + uD  
Where D is defined as D=1 if the student chooses a private voucher school, and 
D=0 if the student chooses a public school. 
The selection rule is defined as:  
D=1  if  D*=Zθ+u >0;  D=0  otherwise. 
D* denotes the net gain associated with attending a private voucher school.  
This is the selection equation. 
                                                 
8  They are not asked to declare the exact amount they pay, but to classify themselves according 
to a predefined schedule.   7
The vector of observable characteristics affecting school choice, Z, 
includes the variables of the outcome equation, X, in addition to a new variable 
(the exclusion restriction) defined as follows: the ratio of the average school fee 
charged by PS schools in the year 2000, to the average 1999 language SIMCE 
test result in PS schools. Note that both averages are for the geographical area 
in which the student goes to school (the same ratio is constructed for municipal 
schools)
9,10. These ratios can be considered proxies for the average unit price of 
private subsidized and public education by geographical area (the price per unit 
of test score).  Note that these are not the prices that individual students face, 
but the average price in the area they where they go to school.  
In Appendix A there is a description of the variables used in the 
estimation. 
















































Under this distributional assumption, the average treatment effect (ATE) 
and the effect of treatment on the treated (TT) conditional on X are defined as 
follows:  
() 0 1 ) ( β β − = X X ATE       
                                                 
9 We obtain the average school fee from the CASEN 2000 survey. We used 1999 year test 
scores, because this was the last year that SIMCE was taken by 4
th grade students. 
10 We correct standard errors for the grouping procedure. Hence, we assume that unobservables 
are independent across groups (geographical areas) but not necessarily independent within 
groups.   8
( ) ( ) ( ) θ λ σ ρ σ ρ β β Z X D Z X TT − − + − = = 0 0 1 1 0 1 ) 1 , , (  
Unconditional parameters are estimated as the average of the conditional 





The crucial assumption for the validity of our exclusion restriction is 
that the price of private subsidized and municipal education faced by the 
student affect school selection, but not potential test scores. The first part of the 
assumption is validated by the data (especially for the price of PS schools, 
where the variance is higher): the probability of attending a private subsidized 
school is higher in geographical areas where private subsidized education is, on 
average, cheaper. That is, as with any other good, the demand for private 
subsidized education rises when its price is reduced. 
As usual, no credible empirical test exists as to the validity of the second 
part of the assumption, that is, that the average unit price of education is not 
related to the unobservable characteristics that affect test scores. There is no 
reason to think that the average unit price of private subsidized and municipal 
education in the geographical area where the student goes to school should be 
directly related to the unobservable student characteristics that affect test 
scores. But under certain conditions those average prices may be indirectly 
related to the unobservable characteristics that affect test results. 
                                                 
11  See Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000)   9
There are two situations where the latter relationship could emerge:  the 
first is when students can easily go to a school outside the geographical area 
they live in (“student mobility”); the second is when families can easily choose 
their area of residence (“residential mobility”).  If either student mobility or 
residential mobility were high, we might expect that families with certain 
characteristics that may affect test scores (e.g. more informed or educated 
families), would choose geographical areas where the average per unit price of 
subsidized education is lower. Hence, if this were the case, the average per unit 
price of education would not be a valid exclusion restriction. However, as we 
explain below, we think that this is not the case in our data set. 
A special feature of 2002 data is that it is the only available survey 
where parents are asked their area of residence. Therefore, we know not only 
the geographical area (municipality) where the school is located, but also the 
area where the children live. It allows us to test how often children attend a 
school outside their residential area (student mobility). We find that in fourth 
grade of primary school, student mobility is very low: 89% of students go to 
school in their area of residence
12. 
We also assert that residential mobility is low, as a result of the large 
fraction of families in our data set that live in social-program housing, and the 
legal restrictions they face that prevent mobility. According to the CASEN 
2000 survey, around 40% of the students of subsidized elementary schools live 
                                                 
12  It appears that mobility is higher in 8
th grade, since year 2000 data (which is the last survey 
for 8
th grade) shows that 33% of students report that they had changed schools after 4
th grade. 
There is also some evidence (from a drug survey) that mobility is high in secondary education.    10
in social-program houses. Since we consider students who attend low-fee 
schools (usually poorer students), this percentage should be a lower bound of 
the fraction of students in our data set whose families live in public housing. 
Housing policies preclude residential mobility, as shown by Soto and 
Torche (2002).  The authors focus on the fact that the lack of convergence of 
regional income in the Chilean economy is largely associated with low levels of 
interregional migration
13. They argue that this is the result of two policies that 
affected interregional migration in a systematic way: public housing and 
regional development programs. Since 1980 housing policies incorporated 
important limitations to beneficiaries to avoid leakages of subsidies to non-
target groups (i.e., high income quintiles).  The most important limitations were 
a prohibition to sell or rent subsidized houses (until 2001) and the existence of 
rigid norms determining the location of subsidized housing. The authors 
provide econometric evidence that the prohibition to sell or rent subsidized 




Controlling for per-student budget  
To evaluate the relative performance of municipal and private 
subsidized schools, it is important to compare schools with similar budgets. 
                                                 
13 Soto and Torche show that interregional migration in Chile is very low by international 
standards, in particular when one considers that the country is small, the population very 
homogeneous, and urbanization levels quite high. On average, in the 1965-2000 period only 
1.3% of the population moved between regions every year.  
14 A second area in which policies play a role is via regional subsidies given to specific 
economic activities.   11
There are two sources of differences in the budgets of private subsidized and 
municipal schools: one is that some municipal schools receive financial 
assistance from the government above and beyond the value of the voucher, 
especially through additional funds transferred by the municipalities to the 
schools they run; the second is that private subsidized schools are allowed to 
charge fees (up to a limit) through the “financiamiento compartido” or “shared 
funding” regime.    
When analyzing the 2002 data (for 4th grade students in primary 
school), we find that the distribution of test scores in municipal schools is very 
similar across different transfer groups
15, as Figure 1 shows
16.  Groups shown 
in Figure 1 were constructed as quintiles: we sort areas according to the amount 
of additional funds transferred by municipalities to the public schools they run, 
and form five equal sized groups, each representing 20% of the population of 
voucher students.  Since we find that the distribution of test scores is similar 
across transfer quintiles, we estimate treatment parameters considering schools 
in all geographical areas.  
                                                 
15 Sapelli and Vial (2002) grouped geographical areas according the amount of per capita 
subsidy received by municipal schools, and ran separate regressions for each group. They found 
that for 2
nd grade of high school this separation is important. They found a positive and 
significant treatment parameter for areas where additional transfers to public schools are low 
(i.e. in those areas voucher students get higher test scores when they attend a private voucher 
school instead of a public one) and hence PS and public schools work with similar budgets. 
They also found a substantially negative treatment parameter in those areas where additional 
transfers to public schools are high. That is, the public schools that receive the largest transfers 
perform substantially better than PS schools. This result shows the importance of taking into 
account differences on the supply side (i.e. in school budgets) in the estimation of treatment 
parameters (at least for high school). 
16 This may be the result of the way the municipalities assign funds (if they give additional 
funds to high schools instead of primary schools), or it may be evidence that “money does not 
matter” at the primary school level. Since we only have aggregate data on funds transferred to 









When we consider private subsidized schools, we find that the schools 
that charge higher fees do obtain better test scores. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of language test scores when we separate PS schools according to 
the fees they charge. In the first group we considered all the schools where over 
85% of students pay less than Ch$5.000 monthly. This group represents 27% of 
the population of private subsidized students. They receive on average 
approximately 5% of their total educational budget from parents
17. Hence, in 
the estimation we consider only PS schools that belong to this group, that is, PS 
schools that charge very low fees (or charge no fees at all). These are the 
schools that are most representative of a “pure” voucher system, where all 
schools work with similar budgets, a budget consisting mainly of the value of 
the per student voucher. 
                                                 
17  Municipal schools cannot charge fees, but parents also declare payments to those schools, 
through parent associations, for example. We also focus on municipal schools where more than 
85% of the students pay less than Ch$5.000 monthly. We find that this group of schools 
represents 72% of the population of public students, and that the amount of money received 
from parents represents approximately 5% of their funds (excluding municipal transfers). 
Figure 1: Distribution of language test scores in MUN 
































Table 1 shows the treatment parameters estimated considering all geographical 
areas, and all the schools where more than 85% of the students declare that they 
pay less than Ch$5.000 (i.e. low levels of additional funding). We find a 
positive and statistically significant ATE and TT
18. When we separate income 
groups, we find that even in low income groups the treatment effects are 
positive and large in magnitude (more than 25% of a standard deviation).   
Regression results are shown in Appendix B, where we obtain the usual results 
in the education literature: more per-capita income, parental education and pre-
school education increases test scores, and girls attain better results than boys. 
In the selection equation we find that a higher price per unit of test score 
                                                 
18  When we estimate using instrumental variables, we find a treatment parameter of 20.4 in 
language and 18 in math. 



















More than 85% of the
students pay less than
Ch$5.000 (mainly
voucher finaced schools)
Less than 85% of the
students pay less than
Ch$5.000 (significant
funding in addition to
voucher)  14
charged by private subsidized schools in a geographical area increases the 
















If we use different specifications, we find similar results, implying the 
results are robust. For example, when we run regressions including all schools 
(independent of the fee charged) and we control for school fees in the 
regressions, we find a similar TT 
19, when we consider the same group of 
                                                 







ATE* ATE/SD TT* TT/SD
All 243.2 52.0 17.2 33% 19.1 37%
(8.5) (6.6)
Income <Ch$100M 229.6 50.5 15.7 31% 17.5 35%
Income: Ch$100M-200M 244.9 50.7 18.3 36% 20.1 40%
Income: Ch$200M-300M 256.9 49.6 16.5 33% 18.1 36%
Income: Ch$300M-400M 265.1 49.1 17.9 37% 19.5 40%
Income: Ch$400M-600M 270.4 49.0 20.1 41% 21.5 44%
Income: Ch$600M-800M 276.4 49.4 23.9 48% 25.3 51%
Income: Ch$800M-1.200M 259.7 54.5 18.0 33% 19.7 36%







ATE* ATE/SD TT* TT/SD
All 239.9 51.8 21.4 41% 17.1 33%
(8.1) (7.7)
Income <Ch$100M 226.6 50.5 21.4 42% 16.8 33%
Income: Ch$100M-200M 241.9 50.4 21.7 43% 17.4 35%
Income: Ch$200M-300M 253.7 50.0 20.0 40% 15.9 32%
Income: Ch$300M-400M 260.8 48.4 21.3 44% 17.4 36%
Income: Ch$400M-600M 265.6 49.9 21.1 42% 17.4 35%
Income: Ch$600M-800M 271.8 50.9 22.6 44% 18.6 36%
Income: Ch$800M-1.200M 254.7 53.9 21.7 40% 18.1 34%
Income>Ch$1.200M 245.0 61.8 37.2 60% 34.8 56%
*Standard Errors (in parentheses) obtained using parametric bootstrapping
Table 1: Treatment Effects by income group, only schools that charge low 
fees. Without controlling for peer characteristicas  15
students and schools. When we run regressions with all schools but without 
controlling for school fees we find a larger TT 
20, as expected.  
 
IV.  ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF PEER EFFECTS 
The results described in the preceding section tell us that when we 
consider only schools that charge low additional fees (and thus similar total 
fees), voucher students achieve higher test scores when they attend a private 
voucher school instead of a public one. Thus theoretically, if we were to move a 
student from a private voucher school to a public school
21 our findings suggest 
that his test score would fall.  If the sorting process and associated peer effects 
are important, this finding may be the result of being exposed to a better peer 
group in private subsidized schools, and not due to superior teaching by such 
schools. In this section we test this hypothesis.   
 
Test formulation 
Consider two polar scenarios: 
- Case 1 (“Sorting is all that matters”): Public and Private voucher 
schools are equally effective providers of education, and peer group quality is 
an important determinant of the student achievement. Thus, private voucher 
schools obtain better results only due to the sorting process and the associated 
                                                 
20 26.8 in language and 31.3 in math. 
21 In what follows we will consider two thought-experiments in which we move the student 
with and without his peers, and two scenarios (or cases), each of which describes a different 
reality regarding relative effectiveness of PS and public schools.   16
peer effect. Case 1 is consistent with Epple and Romano (1998), who assume 
that achievement (a) is an increasing function on the student’s ability (x) and 
the mean ability of the student body in the school attended (x) 
22, i.e., 
( ) x x a a , = . 
- Case 2 (“School type is all that matters”): Private voucher schools are 
more effective in the production of education, and peer abilities do not affect 
student achievement. Then, if d  denotes school type,  ( ) d x a a , =  using the 
previous notation. Thus, private voucher schools obtain better results simply 
because they are better. This case is consistent with the hypothesis that, since 
both types of schools face different incentives and restrictions, they exploit the 
student’s characteristics differently, making potential test scores in each type of 
school different. 
If Case 1 were true, a positive TT would be the result of a sorting 
process. Therefore, if we perform the experiment of moving a single voucher 
student to a public school (what we shall call Experiment 1), there should be a 
drop in his/her test scores. However, since voucher students obtain better results 
in private voucher schools only because of the composition of their class, if we 
perform the experiment of moving a voucher student with all his classmates to 
a public school (what we call Experiment 2), there should be no effect on test 
                                                 
22  Sapelli (2003) discusses the assumption that only the mean of peer ability is important. He 
argues that other moments of the distribution of peer ability should affect the student’s 
achievement. He finds that a larger standard deviation (SD) of ability in schools implies lower 
test scores, ceteris paribus.  The issue is important, since we cannot change the mean by sorting, 
but we can lower the average of all schools’ SD by sorting (i.e. average class SD can be much 
lower than population SD).   17
scores
23.  Alternatively, if Case 2 were true, the test scores should be reduced in 
both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.   
This is the intuition behind the test we perform in this section: we 
change our estimation strategy in order to compare the treatment parameters 
that result from Experiments 1 and 2.  The results show whether Case 1 or Case 
2 better describes the relative effectiveness of PS and public schools. 
 
Estimation strategy  
In this section we control for peer group characteristics in the output 
equation and estimate new treatment parameters using the coefficients we 
obtain. To this end, we calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the 
years of education of the mothers of all students in each class and include them 
as control variables in the outcome equation
24.  
The new outcome equation is: 
* * *
D D D D u P X Y + + = γ β  
Where  P is the vector of peer characteristics. Therefore, in the new 
outcome equation we control for the same individual-level characteristics as 
before (including educational achievement of both parents) and also for two 
class-level variables which are intended to capture peer effects. The inclusion of 
those new variables results in possibly different coefficients (denoted  by 
*
D β ). 
                                                 
23 Note that both experiments still constitute a partial equilibrium analysis.   
24 Notice that in the previous section we controlled for the education of the student’s mother, 
and now we are controlling for the average education of the mothers of all the students in the 
class.  Hence, in the first section we controlled for the student’s characteristics, but now we are 
also controlling for peer group characteristics.   18
When we control for peer group characteristics in the outcome 
regression, we may be violating the no-feedback condition for treatment effect 
estimation (see Heckman (2001)), because it is possible that since more 
educated parents choose better schools, we will find better peers attending 
better schools. Thus, peer group characteristics may be related to school type. 
For this reason, our preferred treatment effect estimate is the one obtained in the 
previous section.  
It is important to note that in this section we are not estimating peer 
effects, but controlling for peer characteristics (and the same is true for all the 
socioeconomic variables that we control for, since we are not estimating an 
education production function). Furthermore, as peer composition is 
endogenous, the coefficients for those variables cannot be viewed as estimates 
of structural parameters. Much work remains to be done on estimating peer 
effects. For instance, it is not clear how peer effects operate (are they 
symmetrical?) and how they can be identified (due to the causality problem, 
since peer characteristics may be endogenous). 
Using the new coefficients obtained when we control for peer group 
characteristics, we estimate two treatment parameters:  
-  TT1 is the treatment parameter that results if we perform Experiment 
1, that is, if we move a single student to a public school (the expected test score 
change on moving the student is the negative of TT1).  Since in this experiment 
the student leaves his peers behind, after changing schools his new peers are 
municipal school students.  For this reason, when we estimate TT1 we use the   19
average peer group characteristics in municipal schools ( MUN P ) to predict the 
student’s score at the public school. To predict the student’s results at his initial 
(PS) school, we use his actual peer group characteristics. 
-  TT2 is the treatment parameter that results if we perform Experiment 
2, that is, if we move the student along with all his classmates to a public 
school (the expected test score change on moving the student and his 
classmates is the negative of TT2). As this experiment moves the student with 
all his peers, we use the student’s initial peer group characteristics (that is, the 
characteristics of the peer group he had at the PS school) to predict test scores 
in the municipal school. Then, if Case 1 were true and all the difference 
between public and PS schools were due to peer effects, TT2 should be zero. 
If we call the treatment parameter estimated in the previous section TT0, 
then we define TT0
* as TT0 using the new regression coefficients estimated 
when we include peer group characteristics (P) as additional control variables 
(we call these new estimated parameters 
* * * * , , , θ σ ρ β
D D D  and 
*
D γ ).  We can 
relate the treatment parameters resulting from both experiments with TT0* as 
follows: 
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P TT
Z P X TT
   20
TT1 can be separated into two components: the first is the difference in 
potential test scores between private subsidized and municipal schools, and the 
second is the difference in peer group composition between those schools.   
However, TT2 includes only the first component, since in this case we maintain 
the same peer group when we predict outcomes at the two types of schools. 
In the formula for TT2, where we maintain the same peer composition, if 
TT0




0 γ γ = , then TT2  would be zero, implying that potential 
test scores would be equal at both types of schools. This is what occurs in Case 
1 described above, where sorting is what produces differences between school 
results and schools themselves are similarly effective. 
If TT0




1 ≥ −γ γ P
25, a positive TT2 results. That 
is, potential test scores are higher in PS schools even for the same peer 
composition. That is what is implied in Case 2, where sorting is irrelevant and 
superior PS performance is due to better teaching at PS schools. 
Since the peer group in PS schools is better (in the sense that their 
mothers’ education is higher), we should expect TT1  > TT2. The difference 
should be larger if we work with all schools as opposed to only working with 
schools that charge low fees. This is because in the complete sample the 
average mother’s education is 10.9 years in private subsidized schools, and 8.8 
years in municipal schools. But when we focus on schools that charge low fees, 
this difference is reduced (because the average mother’s educational attainment 
                                                 




1 < −γ γ P , but smaller in magnitude than TT0
*.   21
in private subsidized schools is 9.7 years). Thus, for this group of schools 
sorting is not as important as it is for the population as a whole. 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the treatment parameters obtained when we control for 
mean and standard deviation of the education of the mothers of all the students 
in the class. The most important result is that TT2 is still large in magnitude and 
statistically significant. Thus, we reject the hypothesis that schools are equally 
effective (the hypothesis that Case 1 holds in the data) and find that even when 












TT1*T T 1*/SD TT2*T T 2*/SD
All 243.2 52.0 30.8 59% 28.0 54%
(5.5) (5.5)
Income <Ch$100M 229.6 50.5 25.9 51% 27.4 54%
Income: Ch$100M-200M 244.9 50.7 31.7 62% 28.6 56%
Income: Ch$200M-300M 256.9 49.6 32.9 66% 26.5 53%
Income: Ch$300M-400M 265.1 49.1 36.9 75% 28.6 58%
Income: Ch$400M-600M 270.4 49.0 40.2 82% 29.6 60%
Income: Ch$600M-800M 276.4 49.4 45.0 91% 33.5 68%
Income: Ch$800M-1.200M 259.7 54.5 35.1 64% 26.1 48%







TT1*T T 1*/SD TT2*T T 2*/SD
All 239.9 51.8 31.1 60% 28.4 55%
(5.9) (5.9)
Income <Ch$100M 226.6 50.5 27.6 55% 29.1 58%
Income: Ch$100M-200M 241.9 50.4 31.3 62% 28.3 56%
Income: Ch$200M-300M 253.7 50.0 32.8 66% 26.6 53%
Income: Ch$300M-400M 260.8 48.4 36.6 76% 28.7 59%
Income: Ch$400M-600M 265.6 49.9 37.8 76% 27.6 55%
Income: Ch$600M-800M 271.8 50.9 40.2 79% 29.1 57%
Income: Ch$800M-1.200M 254.7 53.9 35.5 66% 26.9 50%
Income>Ch$1.200M 245.0 61.8 52.7 85% 37.9 61%
*Standard Errors (in parentheses) obtained using parametric bootstrapping
Table 2: Treatment Effects by income group, only schools that charge low 
fees. Controlling for peer characteristicas  22
As expected, we find that TT1  > TT2. Nonetheless, the difference 
between them is small in magnitude, because there are no big differences in 
peer group characteristics between the schools we are focusing on. What is 
surprising is that both TT1 and TT2 are bigger than either TT0 or TT0
*. This 
finding is the result of a larger coefficient on peer characteristics in private 
subsidized schools than in municipal schools. That is, TT0 and TT0
* are similar 




1 γ γ > , TT1 and TT2 are larger than TT0. In short, some 
of the treatment effect associated with PS schools that we estimate in this 
section is the product of such schools making better use of peer group 
characteristics than municipal schools.  
Summarizing, average peer characteristics in public schools and in the 
PS schools are not very different (i.e. there is not much sorting), and our results 
show that PS schools make better use of the characteristics of all students. 
Regression results are shown in Appendix C. 
 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
This paper considers an issue that is a central to any evaluation of a 
voucher system: the relative performance of private and public voucher schools. 
To examine this question, it is vital to compare schools with similar budgets, 
which is why we focus on schools that charge low fees to estimate treatment 
parameters.   23
In the first section of the paper we estimate treatment parameters 
(average treatment effect and the effect of treatment on the treated), where 
treatment is defined as attending a private voucher school instead of a public 
one. We find positive treatment parameters that are large in magnitude and 
statistically significant (more than one third of a standard deviation in test 
scores).   
In the second section of the paper we evaluate the importance of peer 
effects on the treatment parameters estimated earlier. We estimate a new 
treatment effect, the result of a thought-experiment in which we move a student 
with all his/her classmates from a private to a public voucher school.  After 
controlling for socioeconomic characteristics of the students and now also of 
their peers, we still find a treatment parameter that is positive, large in 
magnitude and statistically significant (around 50% of a standard deviation on 
test scores).  Therefore we conclude that the positive treatment effects are not 
solely due to the peer effect and sorting. In short, the peer effect is not 
important enough to invalidate results that do not take them into consideration, 
or to change the way that such results are interpreted.  
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Language test score 251.88 52.32
Math test score 247.97 52.19
Dummy PS 0.47 0.50
Dummy income <Ch$100M 0.28 0.45
Dummy income: Ch$100M-200M 0.38 0.49
Dummy income: Ch$200M-300M 0.15 0.35
Dummy income: Ch$300M-400M 0.07 0.25
Dummy income: Ch$400M-600M 0.06 0.24
Dummy income: Ch$600M-800M 0.02 0.14
Dummy income: Ch$800M-1.200M 0.02 0.13
Dummy income>Ch$1.200M 0.01 0.09
Incomplete elementary education (mother) 0.23 0.42
Complete elementary education (mother) 0.09 0.29
Incomplete secondary education (mother) 0.22 0.41
Complete secondary education (mother) 0.13 0.34
Technical educatin (mother) 0.16 0.36
Technical tertiary education (mother) 0.11 0.31
Universitary education (mother) 0.05 0.23
Incomplete elementary education (father) 0.22 0.42
Complete elementary education (father) 0.10 0.29
Incomplete secondary education (father) 0.21 0.41
Complete secondary education (father) 0.13 0.33
Technical educatin (father) 0.17 0.37
Technical tertiary education (father) 0.09 0.29
Universitary education (father) 0.08 0.27
Dummy gender (1: male) 0.50 0.50
Family Size 5.17 2.58
Dummy failed a class (1: no)  0.90 0.30
Age 9.57 1.81
Dummy Preschool education (1: yes) 0.87 0.33
Price per unit of test score, PS schools 34.45 21.16
Price per unit of test score, MUN schools 1.49 2.44
Description of the variables used in the estimation               




Outcome Equation: Language test scores
Number of obs.= 86800
Wald chi2(24)=1071.85 Wald chi2(24)=3886.45
Log likelihood = -140707.9 Log likelihood = -378269.7
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Dummy income: Ch$100M-200M 7.48 0.90 6.06 0.58
Dummy income: Ch$200M-300M 10.65 1.57 11.43 1.01
Dummy income: Ch$300M-400M 15.68 2.35 14.90 1.21
Dummy income: Ch$400M-600M 18.29 2.53 15.06 1.37
Dummy income: Ch$600M-800M 24.97 3.29 17.33 1.91
Dummy income: Ch$800M-1.200M 14.54 3.70 12.10 2.42
Dummy income>Ch$1.200M 18.63 8.08 6.55 3.82
Complete elementary education (mother) 4.24 1.37 4.12 0.83
Incomplete secondary education (mother) 8.20 1.51 6.09 0.68
Complete secondary education (mother) 17.34 1.73 15.01 0.86
Technical educatin (mother) 14.46 1.77 14.31 0.86
Technical tertiary education (mother) 18.14 2.31 17.92 1.05
Universitary education (mother) 23.75 2.43 25.58 1.62
Complete elementary education (father) 3.43 1.31 2.21 0.81
Incomplete secondary education (father) 7.54 0.98 5.51 0.63
Complete secondary education (father) 12.93 1.67 11.69 0.77
Technical educatin (father) 14.31 1.57 10.56 0.79
Technical tertiary education (father) 15.88 1.80 14.89 1.14
Universitary education (father) 22.97 2.51 20.97 1.37
Dummy gender (1: male) -7.66 0.84 -6.72 0.55
Family Size -0.97 0.20 -1.01 0.15
Dummy failed a class (1: no)  28.27 1.29 25.50 0.69
Age 0.23 0.25 0.41 0.11
Dummy Preschool education (1: yes) 3.80 1.25 0.98 0.68
constant 211.50 8.77 200.16 2.22
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comuna)
Estimation Results
Private subsidized schools Municipal schools  26
Outcome Equation: Math test scores
Number of obs.= 86822
Wald chi2(24)=989.02 Wald chi2(24)=3549.52
Log likelihood = -140817.3 Log likelihood = -379180.9
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Dummy income: Ch$100M-200M 6.19 1.00 6.76 0.57
Dummy income: Ch$200M-300M 9.62 1.41 12.21 0.99
Dummy income: Ch$300M-400M 13.64 2.37 15.08 1.22
Dummy income: Ch$400M-600M 13.59 2.89 15.41 1.62
Dummy income: Ch$600M-800M 17.98 3.78 18.58 2.32
Dummy income: Ch$800M-1.200M 11.14 4.31 11.94 2.33
Dummy income>Ch$1.200M 16.29 7.07 1.29 3.68
Complete elementary education (mother) 4.97 1.42 5.04 0.78
Incomplete secondary education (mother) 7.28 1.28 6.77 0.61
Complete secondary education (mother) 17.65 1.60 15.13 0.79
Technical educatin (mother) 14.48 1.50 15.09 0.89
Technical tertiary education (mother) 17.45 2.17 18.10 1.07
Universitary education (mother) 24.94 2.77 25.91 1.48
Complete elementary education (father) 3.90 1.41 2.42 0.81
Incomplete secondary education (father) 6.97 1.15 5.24 0.59
Complete secondary education (father) 12.30 1.70 11.04 0.66
Technical educatin (father) 13.70 1.67 10.89 0.81
Technical tertiary education (father) 13.74 1.54 13.74 1.07
Universitary education (father) 24.05 2.37 19.03 1.32
D u m m y  g e n d e r  ( 1 :  m a l e ) 4 . 5 30 . 9 34 . 9 40 . 5 6
Family Size -0.85 0.19 -0.80 0.10
Dummy failed a class (1: no)  26.70 1.43 24.99 0.73
A g e 0 . 2 40 . 3 00 . 3 70 . 1 1
Dummy Preschool education (1: yes) 4.23 1.25 1.64 0.67
constant 208.44 8.68 190.07 2.21
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comuna)
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Selection Equation:  PS school
Coefficient Standard Error
Dummy income: Ch$100M-200M 0.08 0.02
Dummy income: Ch$200M-300M 0.16 0.04
Dummy income: Ch$300M-400M 0.17 0.06
Dummy income: Ch$400M-600M 0.24 0.07
Dummy income: Ch$600M-800M 0.21 0.08
Dummy income: Ch$800M-1.200M 0.25 0.06
Dummy income>Ch$1.200M 0.33 0.21
Complete elementary education (mother) 0.00 0.02
Incomplete secondary education (mother) 0.06 0.02
Complete secondary education (mother) 0.11 0.03
Technical educatin (mother) 0.18 0.03
Technical tertiary education (mother) 0.19 0.04
Universitary education (mother) 0.17 0.05
Complete elementary education (father) 0.00 0.02
Incomplete secondary education (father) 0.03 0.02
Complete secondary education (father) 0.05 0.03
Technical educatin (father) 0.08 0.03
Technical tertiary education (father) 0.05 0.04
Universitary education (father) 0.04 0.05
Dummy gender (1: male) -0.04 0.02
Family Size 0.00 0.00
Dummy failed a class (1: no)  0.04 0.03
Age 0.00 0.00
Dummy Preschool education (1: yes) -0.05 0.02
Price per unit of test score, PS schools -0.01 0.00
Price per unit of test score, MUN schools 0.02 0.02
constant -0.58 0.12
Language: Coefficient Standard Error
rho PS -0.18 0.11
sigma PS 48.32 0.79
lambda PS -8.62 5.31
rho MUN 0.20 0.08
sigma MUN 48.62 0.45
lambda MUN 9.88 4.05
Math: Coefficient Standard Error
rho PS -0.26 0.10
sigma PS 48.90 1.00
lambda PS -12.69 5.08
rho MUN 0.19 0.09
sigma MUN 48.78 0.45
lambda MUN 9.37 4.29




Outcome Equation: Language test scores
Number of obs.= 86799
Wald chi2(24)=1564.00 Wald chi2(24)=3981.11
Log likelihood = -140336.9 Log likelihood = -377621.5
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Dummy income: Ch$100M-200M 4.60 0.76 4.25 0.56
Dummy income: Ch$200M-300M 5.56 1.32 7.41 0.88
Dummy income: Ch$300M-400M 9.90 1.93 9.38 1.04
Dummy income: Ch$400M-600M 10.56 2.27 8.62 1.38
Dummy income: Ch$600M-800M 16.53 2.72 10.23 1.90
Dummy income: Ch$800M-1.200M 7.18 3.46 7.81 2.18
Dummy income>Ch$1.200M 4.38 5.46 1.91 3.73
Complete elementary education (mother) 2.19 1.26 3.50 0.83
Incomplete secondary education (mother) 3.87 1.27 3.27 0.65
Complete secondary education (mother) 11.27 1.50 11.06 0.76
Technical educatin (mother) 8.62 1.47 9.90 0.78
Technical tertiary education (mother) 10.31 2.30 11.86 0.95
Universitary education (mother) 16.16 2.30 19.09 1.49
Complete elementary education (father) 2.57 1.25 1.92 0.81
Incomplete secondary education (father) 4.79 0.96 3.49 0.62
Complete secondary education (father) 9.40 1.46 9.14 0.74
Technical educatin (father) 10.62 1.44 7.68 0.76
Technical tertiary education (father) 10.89 1.87 10.93 1.06
Universitary education (father) 16.11 2.06 16.42 1.26
Dummy gender (1: male) -6.56 0.83 -6.25 0.55
Family Size -0.76 0.17 -0.93 0.14
Dummy failed a class (1: no)  24.35 1.52 24.46 0.71
Age 0.23 0.25 0.42 0.11
Dummy Preschool education (1: yes) 2.37 1.10 0.61 0.71
Average years of education of the mother at the c 6.84 0.72 5.40 0.41
SD of years of education of the mother at the cla 0.23 1.83 -0.26 1.25
constant 156.65 14.56 155.54 6.59
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comuna)
Estimation Results: controlling for peer group characteristics
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Outcome Equation: Math test scores
Number of obs.= 86821
Wald chi2(24)=1380.98 Wald chi2(24)=3402.21
Log likelihood = -140512 Log likelihood = -378585.7
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Dummy income: Ch$100M-200M 3.61 0.90 5.00 0.57
Dummy income: Ch$200M-300M 4.98 1.27 8.27 0.90
Dummy income: Ch$300M-400M 8.42 2.07 9.74 1.16
Dummy income: Ch$400M-600M 6.58 2.60 9.17 1.59
Dummy income: Ch$600M-800M 10.37 3.35 11.65 2.15
Dummy income: Ch$800M-1.200M 4.52 3.55 7.73 2.26
Dummy income>Ch$1.200M 3.34 5.01 -3.39 3.57
Complete elementary education (mother) 3.08 1.40 4.45 0.79
Incomplete secondary education (mother) 3.33 1.20 4.04 0.60
Complete secondary education (mother) 12.13 1.51 11.25 0.75
Technical educatin (mother) 9.16 1.34 10.75 0.77
Technical tertiary education (mother) 10.35 2.24 12.12 0.98
Universitary education (mother) 18.09 2.76 19.52 1.39
Complete elementary education (father) 3.15 1.37 2.12 0.81
Incomplete secondary education (father) 4.49 1.10 3.29 0.58
Complete secondary education (father) 9.13 1.52 8.56 0.66
Technical educatin (father) 10.39 1.61 8.09 0.80
Technical tertiary education (father) 9.22 1.52 9.92 0.96
Universitary education (father) 17.82 1.94 14.62 1.29
D u m m y  g e n d e r  ( 1 :  m a l e ) 5 . 5 40 . 9 55 . 4 30 . 5 6
Family Size -0.67 0.17 -0.72 0.10
Dummy failed a class (1: no)  23.19 1.56 23.97 0.75
A g e 0 . 2 50 . 3 00 . 3 90 . 1 1
Dummy Preschool education (1: yes) 2.93 1.13 1.31 0.69
Average years of education of the mother at the c 6.18 0.65 5.21 0.41
SD of years of education of the mother at the cla 0.06 1.54 -0.26 1.39
constant 159.35 11.81 146.40 6.81
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comuna)
Private subsidized schools Municipal schools  30
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